Environmental Values Emerging from
Cultures and Religions of the ASEAN Region. Roman Meinhold (Ed.). Bangkok: P.
Press, 2015, 31-54.
Abstract
In the face of modern day environmental problems,
various religious systems are turned to for inspiration to support
environmental conservation. Buddhism is often employed as a resource since it
is perceived as an environment friendly religion that provides an alternative
to strongly anthropocentric views and attitudes that perceive the value of
nature in merely instrumental terms, and thus would justify wanton exploitation
of natural resources to benefit the needs of human beings. The secular
environmental ethic notion of intrinsic value in nature is often applied to
Buddhism in which Buddhist textual souerces are examined for evidence to support
the assumption that if nature is seen to possess intrinsic value or at least
positive value, it follows that nature has rights that must be respected by
human beings. This paper sets out to review the application of the
intrinsic-value-in-nature concept to Theravada Buddhism, and argues that such a
task is problematic in this case because Buddhism with its doctrine of not-self
is incompatible with the project of ascribing intrinsic value to nature.
Rather, in Buddhism, the ultimate value is liberation from saṃsāric
life. This paper argues that the soteriological aims of Theravada Buddhism
prescribe a lifestyle that steers away from greed, hatred and delusion which
characterize an unwholesome life. As one goes about eliminating unwholesome
states from one’s life, one needs to develop various virtues that would
contribute to spiritual progress and achievement of personal salvation. Many of
the virtues aimed at achieving liberation from saṃsāra
can be framed in context of environmental concerns to reflect their connection
to environmental well-being. Thus, promoting environmental well-being can be
seen as part and parcel of the overall Buddhist agenda to achieve spiritual
progress, personal well-being, and ultimately, nirvanic bliss.
In the age of
increasing awareness of the escalating ecological destruction occurring in the
world, religion continues to be a source of inspiration for discovering and
retrieving valuable ideas to build a practical and cohesive environmental ethic.
Undoubtedly, world religions such as Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism are
enthusiastically turned to for inspiration and directions, partially because it
is believed, as Hans Küng pointed out, absoluteness
and universality of ethical obligation finds its purpose and reason in
religious belief. Unconditional obligation cannot be derived from abstract
ideas of “humanity” if there is no religion to enforce them (53). The Thai monk
professor Phra Dharmakosajarn affirms, “If we employ our lives correctly,
environment problems could be solved through our religion teachings” (23). He
also adds that if religious adherents make an effort to understand more deeply
their religious heritage, it would positively affect their behavior towards
living things and the environment (41). Many environmental advocates who
believe that religions can serve as a beneficial resource hail Buddhism as an
“environmentally friendly” religion, a claim that is not without ground.
However, in regards to Theravada or early Buddhism, which is the predominant
ambit in mainland Southeast Asia, one must outline an approach that is
authentic to the nature of the religion rather than being imposed upon by
notions from secular environmentalism that may not cohere with essential
Buddhist beliefs.
The
Intrinsic Value Debate in Secular Environmental Ethic
Religious environmental
ethics often take their cues from secular environmental ethic, especially in regards
to the issue of value in nature, where the question of whether or not nature
has intrinsic value is a bone of contention. It is thus important to briefly
review what exactly is meant by intrinsic value. The Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary defines the word “intrinsic” as “belonging to the essential nature
of a thing” while the word value is defined as “relative
worth, utility, or importance”. Taken together, “intrinsic value” can be said
to be the value or the worth that belongs to the essential nature or
constitution of a thing. Intrinsic value is distinguished from instrumental
value in which something is valued by a particular subject as a means only.
However, John O’Neill has pointed out that the term “intrinsic value” has been
used in at least three different basic senses in various literatures (131-142). The first sense is that an object has intrinsic
value when it is an end in itself. Arne Naess, the founder of deep ecology
argues that “The well-being of non-human life on Earth has value in itself.
This value is independent of any instrumental usefulness for limited human
purposes” (quoted in O’Neill 131).
The
second sense refers to the “intrinsic properties” belonging to a natural entity
that is constitutive of its flourishing. Paul W. Taylor posits a “biocentric
ethic” that all living individual organisms possess intrinsic value because
they are teleological centers of life. Through their adaptive mechanisms and
biological functions, they indicate themselves to have goals of living,
flourishing, and propagating themselves. Organisms indicate themselves to be
self-valuing, goal-seeking individuals independent of any human valuation of
them. Thus by recognizing that non-human organisms have “inherent worth,” it is
sufficient to devise prescriptive or prohibitive norms that prevent human
interference in the development and flourishing of these life forms (74-84).
The
third sense is not so much an axiological claim as a metaethical position in
that here intrinsic value is identified as an “objective value,” meaning a natural
entity is itself a source and locus of value independent of human
valuation. The epistemological stance here is taken against the subjectivist
value theory which argues for a conscious valuer that confers value onto
objects.
Holmes Roston III argues that each organism has a telos or a “valued state.” By
virtue of its DNA-programmed activities, it seeks to attain certain states
while avoiding others. Because the telos
is a valued state, Roston III reasons, the fulfillment of the telos involves the
realization of value. This value is what he refers to as “natural value.”
However, there is also a “systemic value” in which entities in nature either
possess their own telos or have a role of producing or supporting the
teleological processes of life in a “projective nature.” According to Roston,
the existence of this value is “objective” and not “subjective” because it does
not depend on the presence of any minds (143-153).
J. Baird Callicott
disagrees with Roston III that value can be objective. Callicott maintains that
value is foremost a verb and only becomes a noun derivatively. The act of
valuing, thus requires an intentional act of a subject who ascribes value on an
object. According to Callicott, “Subjects think, perceive, desire, and value. The
intentions, the targets, of a subject's valuing are valuable, just as the
intentions of a subject's desiring are desirable. If there were no desiring
subjects, nothing would be desirable. If there were no valuing subjects, nothing
would be valuable” (298). Callicott
maintains that intentionally conscious beings value things in two ways:
intrinsically and instrumentally. Human beings value ourselves intrinsically as
well as instrumentally. We can also ascribe the same values to other entities
around us. However, when it comes to intrinsic value, human beings are only
willing to ascribe intrinsic value to something with good reasons (259). The
effort of Callicott, therefore, is to come up with the reasons sufficient
enough for human beings to value entities in nature intrinsically.
In
environmental ethics, the search for intrinsic value in nature is important
because the act of ascribing intrinsic value to, or as some would argue
discovering intrinsic value in, nature is fundamental to according moral status
to aspects of nature or to nature as a whole (Afeissa 531). For many
environmental philosophers to hold an environmental ethic is to hold that
non-human nature has intrinsic value in one sense or another. Thus, the notion
of intrinsic value is the sine qua non of nonanthropocentric environmental
ethic (Nunez 105). The
task of the environmental ethic today is to do two things. First, it must prove
that natural entities possess intrinsic value of particular degrees based on
reasonable criteria. Second, it accords moral obligations and responsibility to
human beings in how they ought to treat nature in view of the existence of such
intrinsic value (Afeissa 529).
The intrinsic
value debate among environmental philosophers, however, does not simply revolve
around how and in what degrees intrinsic value ought to be ascribed to
non-human nature. Neopragmatists such as Bryan Norton take an
antifoundationalist stance and denies that these metaethical issues need to be
settled or even can be settled before actions are taken on behalf of the
ecology. Norton feels that the time and energy spent on disputing whether
nature has intrinsic or instrumental value or whether the intrinsic values are
objective or subjective are done at the cost of coming up with timely solutions
to counter environmental destruction. For Norton, a long and wide
anthropocentrism “converges” on the same practical applications as the
non-anthropocentrists. Thus, time and energy is better spent on refining
environmental policies rather than debating theoretical matters (187-204).
However, nonanthropocentrists like Callicott strongly disagree with Norton, and
thus the debate continues despite it not being able to obtain any satisfactory
consensus. For secular environmental ethics then, the quest for intrinsic value
in nature remains a foundational issue for achieving ecological well-being.
Buddhism and the
Value of Nature
Based on the
above discussion, one can see that the question of what kind of value should be
ascribed to nature is a central issue in modern environmental ethics. Despite
the lack of consensus, the question is of such great significance that it is
not surprising that this matter gets transferred to religion when these systems
are examined for resources to support an environmental ethic. For example, in
Christianity, some scholars claim that nature has intrinsic value because all
creation was proclaimed to be good by God after it was created.[2]
With respect to Buddhism, while the perspectives may be described as spanning a
continuum, we can fundamentally group them into opposing camps, one which
affirms that Buddhism places positive value on nature while the other denies
this to be the case. Lambert Schmithausen falls into the latter group when he
observes:
In the canonical
texts of Early Buddhism, all mundane existence is regarded as unsatisfactory,
either because suffering prevails, or because existence is inevitably
impermanent... Nature cannot but be ultimately unsatisfactory, for it too is
marked by pain and death, or at least by impermanence... Therefore, the only
goal worth striving for is Nirvāṇa, which [is] entirely beyond mundane
existence. (12)
Ultimate value, says
Schmithausen, is placed on attainment of salvation and not on the preservation
of nature. The critics generally hold the view that Buddhist soteriology, which
recognizes the goal of attaining liberation as the ultimate good, entails
placing negative value on nature. Ian Harris charges contemporary Buddhists as
having assented to secular environmental concerns without having real basis in
central Buddhist teachings (110). Harris holds one of the more extreme
positions in asserting that early Buddhism cannot accommodate an environmental
ethic with its view toward nature and its soteriological outlook. After
examining carefully the Buddhist attitudes toward animals and plants from the
early canon, Harris concludes that any value placed on them were instrumental
and not much concern for their preservation was displayed.
Other scholars
are less ready to deny that Buddhism does not accord any value to nature;
however, few are willing to go so far as to claim that nature in Buddhism has
intrinsic value. John J. Holder, for example, points out that in Buddhism,
nature can objectively be seen to have profound value because nature helps
facilitate a person’s spiritual progress (116). For Holder, nature has positive
value when it is used pragmatically within a Buddhist framework that promotes a
spiritual path that entails living in the natural world (p. 122). Even Daniel
H. Henning, who advocates an intimate connection between Buddhism and Deep
Ecology admits that it is not possible to ascribe intrinsic value to nature in
the Buddhist outlook (16). To be sure
countless writers have pointed to evidence that support the value of nature, seen
in the fact that the Buddha was said to be born, achieved enlightenment, and
died under various types of trees, lived and taught in natural environments,
and often taught his disciples using examples from nature. However, these facts
do not necessarily mean that nature has intrinsic value in the manner of
secular environmental ethic. Thus, in Buddhism, there is far from a consensus
as to what kind of value nature has, if any at all. However, as I will show in
the following paragraphs, expending energy on this matter may prove to be
futile in view of Buddhist doctrines, and the effort to employ Buddhism as a
resource to advance an environmental ethic may be better served by looking into
other avenues within the tradition itself.
The
Buddhist Concept of Self
There
is one point that underlies the intrinsic-value-in-nature debate, and that
value, whether objective or subjective, presupposes a container or holder of
value. This holder of value, whether conscious or unconscious, sentient or
insentient, is called a self or the essence of a thing. While in Western
philosophy, the notion of a substantiated entity is normative, to apply the
same categories to Eastern philosophy, in particular Buddhism, becomes
problematic. Buddhism’s doctrine of not-self is precisely what makes our entire
discussion on whether nature has or does not have intrinsic value futile
because this doctrine negates any idea of a fixed, static entity, in effect, a
holder of value. The doctrine of not-self, moreover, makes it not possible to
speak of whether the value in nature is positive or negative because no final
view is taken on this matter as well.
Buddhism’s
threefold doctrine of aniccā-dukkha-anattā known as the Three Marks of
Existence together deny the concept of self (attā). Aniccā or impermanence
serves as the first characteristic from which the other two characteristics are
derived. It asserts that everything is in a state of flux, and the impression
that things being permanent are simply an illusion (Hawkins 42). Thus, this
mark of existence denies what is normally perceived to be “real” in the
phenomenal world in Western thinking. Dukkha, translated as mental or
physical pain or suffering, constitutes the second mark of existence and is
directly related to the first. According to the Buddha’s teaching, all things
that are impermanent are one way or another unsatisfactory and to place one’s
trust and dependence on impermanent things is doom to failure. Suffering, thus,
represents the unsatisfactoriness that comes from the dislocations in one’s
life when one undergoes the trauma of birth and fear of death, the experience
of sickness and old age, the discomfort in being tied to what one dislikes and
separated from what one loves. Dukkha, then is the result of tanhā,
often translated as desire. However, there are good desires and there are bad
desires. Tanhā represents the selfish desires for private fulfillment
that throws us out of a state of freedom and causes us to experience increasing
pain and suffering (Smith 102). Dukkha is not limited to painful
experience but even to pleasurable experiences because even such experiences
are impermanent and thus liable to suffering (Nyanatiloka 110).
While aniccā and dukkha are
intimately connected with the Buddhist negation of self, it is in the third
mark of existence that this negation is directly stated, the doctrine of anattā.
This unique invention that makes up the central Buddhist teaching declares that
there is no self existing real ego-entity, soul or any other permanent
substance either within the bodily and mental phenomena of existence or outside
of them. The anattā doctrine must be taken seriously by those attempting
to investigate Buddhism for resources of environmental ethic because this is
the one doctrine upon which all Buddhist philosophy is built, and is uniquely a
Buddhist teaching not found in other religions. An accurate understanding of
Buddhism rests on the understanding that reality is comprised of mere
continually self-consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental
phenomena, and that there is no separate ego-entity within or without this
process. C. H. S. Ward warns, "We must try to overcome the difficulty of
thinking of 'will' without a 'willer'; of 'deed' without a 'doer'; of
'suffering' without a 'sufferer'; in a word, of life being carried on without
personal agents" (Quoted in Love 304).
Thus,
in Buddhism, life is but a composite of the five aggregates (khandha)
divided into two parts (mental and physical).
The four aggregates of feeling, perception, dispositions and
consciousness comprise the mental part while the form is the physical part of
the individual. The Buddha teaches that all these aggregates are characterized
by impermanence, suffering, and changeableness. Human existence as we observe
it is comprised merely of processes the mental and physical phenomena which has
been going on since time immemorial and will continue for unthinkably long
periods of time. The fact that these five aggregates are present and
“co-operate” in these processes does not mean a presence of any self-dependent
real ego-entity or personality (Nyanatiloka 160). Every configuration of
aggregates is a momentary force or entity separate from the next. An often
employed analogy to drive the point of not-self home is the image of a cart
that is essentially an aggregate of all its parts, the wheels, the axel, the
pole, the cart-body, and so forth placed in a certain relationship to one
another. However, the cart as a static
and permanent entity is a mere illusion (Vis.M.XVIII). The famous Buddhist
commentator Buddhaghosa explained the existence of beings as follows:
In the ultimate
sense the life-moment of living beings is extremely short, being only as much as
the occurrence of a single conscious moment. Just as a chariot wheel, when it
is rolling, rolls [that is, touches the ground] only on one point of [the
circumference of] its tire, and, when it is at rest, rests only on one point,
so too, the life of living beings lasts only for a single conscious moment.
When that consciousness has ceased, the being is said to have ceased, according
as it is said: “In a past conscious moment he did live, not he does live, not
he will live. In a future conscious moment not he did live, not he does live,
he will live. In the present conscious moment not he did live, he does live,
not he will live.” (Vis.M.VIII)
The
five aggregates, the Buddha teaches, are not under control of anybody. It is
improper to consider these khandhas as “this is mine” or “this is I” or
“this is my self” (Varanasi 14). The processes observed are the result of
Dependent Origination (Paṭiccasamuppāda), a theory that
attempts to show that all phenomena are conditionally related to one another. The teaching which is found in countless
sutras is stated in an abstract formula as follows:
When
this exists, that comes to be; with the
arising of this, that
arises.
When
this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this,
that ceases.(
S.II.21.)
Paṭiccasamuppāda also known as “the wheel of life” or
“the wheel of becoming” is a chain of twelve links (nidanas). These
links are both cause and effect. Every link constitutes itself as cause for the
subsequently resulting effect, and as resulting effect for the preceding cause
(Varanasi 14). In light of this theory, any questions that attempt to prove the
existence of a self such as “Who is the cause of suffering?”, “Who suffers?”,
“Who is the owner of this body?” are all considered in Buddhism to be improper
questions. The only question that can be asked is "Which cause is
responsible for that result".
The theory of Dependent Origination,
thus, posits that all things exist in a continuum of interdependence and
inter-relatedness, characterized by an unceasing process of growth and decline
as a result of various determinants. This ever changing and continuing process
indicates that things cannot have an intrinsic entity. The Thai scholar monk Phra
Prayudh Payutto explicates this idea in the negative form as follows:
If things had
any intrinsic entity they would have to possess some stability; if they could
be stable, even for a moment, they could not be truly inter-related; if they
were not inter-related they could not be formed into a continuum; if there were
no continuum of cause and effect, the workings of nature would be impossible;
and if there were some real intrinsic self within that continuum there could be
no true inter-dependent cause and effect process. The continuum of cause and
effect which enables all things to exist as they do can only operate because
such things are transient, ephemeral, constantly arising and ceasing and having
no intrinsic entity of their own. (15)
Thus, according to Payutto, the
principle of Dependent Origination serves to show that in the various events in
nature, all the properties of impermanence, suffering, and not-self are seen, all of which reinforce the Buddhist
denial of the existence of any real substance which could be duly called
“self.” It must be noted, however, that Buddhism does not necessarily deny the
empirical individual because in the canon, the Buddha often uses the term “attā”
in order to speak of himself or of others. This usage by the Buddha only
connotes a conventional expression and not meant to be interpreted as a
permanent substance. To know oneself, to understand one’s body, and to
understand the nature of the five aggregates is what is meant by the Buddha’s
statements and does not refer to a permanent self (Varanasi 16).
The Buddhist negation of an
intrinsic self thus presents a problem for the attempt to apply secular
environmental ethic notions of intrinsic value in nature to Buddhism. Fundamentally, the environmental ethic
project aims to designate intrinsic value to various entities in nature, by
which human beings would then be morally obligated to respect nature. However,
having value implies that there is a holder of value, which means that there
must be a real self. The Buddhist negation of a real self characterized by its
three marks of existence, impermanence, suffering, and particularly not-self
makes it difficult for it to accommodate this secular ethical notion. If we
take Buddhist philosophy to its ultimate conclusion, then when it comes to
nature and human beings, given enough time, all the entities in nature, the
cosmos, and in particular human beings, will change and eventually cease to be
because all things are ultimately impermanent. In effect, while an important
goal of secular environmental ethic is to come to a consensus on the intrinsic
value of nature that would be the basis for environmental conservation,
Buddhism does not have the same outlook. In fact, Buddhism does not come to any
conclusion at all about the value of nature, whether positive or negative.
Buddhism sets its sight on the ultimate goal of liberation, in which a thing
ceases to be. Therefore, in order for Buddhism to serve as a practical resource
for promoting environmental well-being, there needs to be a different approach
that must arise from within the Buddhist tradition itself, not asking it to
compromise its basic doctrines for the sake of contemporary Western
philosophical thought.
Buddhist
soteriology and virtues
Interestingly,
it is this ultimate value of liberation from saṃsāric life that holds
the key to how Buddhism can most effectively contribute to promoting
environmental well-being. The reason this is so is because one’s soteriological
goals have a direct impact on how one conducts his life and enters into
relationship with fellow human beings and the natural world around him. In the
attempt to achieve spiritual progress, the Buddhist has to practice and perfect
certain virtues that aim at promoting personal well-being, and in the process
contributes to the well-being of others, both sentient as well as non-sentient.
As Holder argues, the path leading to human fulfillment does not have to
necessarily exclude doing things that benefit non-human existence.
It is a false
dichotomy, according to early Buddhism, to say that a genuine environmental
ethic must develop values that are for nature’s own sake, rather than for the
sake of human beings—that an environmental ethic must give nature an intrinsic,
ultimate, value over against[3]
human interests or values. The only thing resembling an ultimate value in early
Buddhism is the elimination of the suffering of sentient creatures—and this
includes human beings. (126)
Indeed, in the Sedaka
Suttra of the Saṃyutta Nikāya, the Buddha
teaches his disciples that “Protecting oneself…one protects others; protecting
others, one protects oneself” (S 5:19). The former is done through cultivation
of mindfulness, whereas the latter is accomplished with various virtues such as
patience, loving kindness and sympathy. Accordingly,
the Suttras in Aṅguttara Nikāya teach that there
are four types of people: those who act on behalf of oneself but not others,
those who act on behalf of others but not oneself, those
who act neither on behalf of oneself nor of others, and those who act both on
behalf of oneself and on behalf of others. Of these four, the last type of
person is considered to be “the foremost, the best, the preeminent, the
supreme, and the finest of these four” (A 4:95). Thus, Buddhism indeed would
support a person leading a lifestyle that not only benefits his goals for
personal salvation, but at the same time serves the needs of the environment.
The virtues that
are relevant to our discussion include, inter alia, loving kindness,
compassion, gentleness, moderation, and gratitude. While one may very well
refer to these virtues in non-environmental contexts when it comes to how a
Buddhist is to conduct her life, a simple reorientation of these virtues makes
them entirely relevant to environmental concerns. As Damien Keown writes:
One only needs
to read the Dhammapada to see that the Buddhist ideal of human
perfection is defined in terms of the virtues exercised by an individual who
treats all beings with kindness and compassion, lives honestly and righteously,
controls his sensual desires, speaks the truth and lives a sober upright life,
diligently fulfilling his duties, such as service to parents, to his immediate
family and to those recluses and Brahmans who depend on the laity for their
maintenance…. A Buddhist ecology, then, coincides with these teachings and
simply calls for the orientation of traditional virtues towards a new set of
problems concerned with the environment. (109-110)
The
environmental problem of the present day, early Buddhists would agree, has its
roots in human moral psychology. They stem from human greed and delusions that
lead to wanton exploitation of natural resources and other acts of violence
done to the environment. As Pragati Sahni contends:
In all likelihood the environmental crisis to the
early Buddhists is the manifestation of a psychological crisis because most
physical actions and outward behavior are shaped by what is going on in the
mind. As long as the mind is influenced by the three unwholesome principles of rāga,
dosa and moha or greed, hatred and delusion the human race will be
stricken by environmental and other forms of exploitation, as well as selfish
actions, greedy consumer cultures, dissatisfaction and other attitudes that can
be looked upon as vices. (165)
These
perversions are effectively counteracted with virtues that lead to promoting
human well-being, and in the process environmental well-being. Thus, with the
goal of orientating normative Buddhist virtues to the environmental crisis, we
now examine more closely the list of virtues that have been mentioned above.
Loving kindness
and compassion
Loving kindness
(mettā) and compassion (karunā) are two of the four sublime
abodes (brahma-vihāra) along with sympathetic joy, and equanimity.
Loving kindness is the wish that all sentient beings, without exception, be
happy while compassion is the genuine desire to alleviate the sufferings of
others which one is able to feel. The text that one often encounters when
discussing about loving kindness is from the Suttras which states:
I
dwell pervading one quarter with a mind imbued with loving-kindness, likewise
the second quarter, the third quarter, and the fourth quarter. Thus above,
below, across, and everywhere, and to all as to myself, I dwell pervading the
entire world with a mind imbued with loving-kindness, vast, exalted,
measureless, without enmity, without ill will. (A, 3:63)
Along with
loving kindness, the person who exhibits compassion towards others and has
their well-being in mind ultimately makes progress in his own spiritual state.
For each of these as well as the other sublime virtues, the Buddha exhorted the
monks to assiduously train themselves so that they are able to carry out these
virtues beyond their immediate neighbors, extending to the entire world (Sahni
120).
As one can see,
loving kindness and compassion when practiced diligently by the Buddhist person
has direct implications on the environment. As Simon P. James points out, someone
who is truly compassionate extends his compassion to human as well as non-human
beings. If he is only compassionate towards human beings, then he would not be
considered a truly compassionate person. Thus, a person’s dealings with
non-human sentient beings, i.e. animals would reflect on his level of
virtuousness (457). One may ask the question, if loving kindness and compassion
are only extended to human beings and non-human sentient beings, then what good
is that when it comes to plants and other non-sentient entities? Certainly, a
person would hardly be considered compassionate if he goes about destroying
rainforests which serves as the habitat for countless animal creatures big and
small. In the same manner, a person would hardly be considered to be suffusing
the world with loving kindness if he chooses to fill the air and rivers with
dangerous chemicals that harm living things. Thus, the implication for loving
kindness and compassion in the context of the environment is that it must
respond to all dimensions of life that ultimately holds ramifications for
different aspects of the ecology. Buddhism indeed encourages people to be kind
and compassionate in a thoroughgoing manner and not just on a selective basis.
Gentleness
We
come to the second virtue that promotes human flourishing and would likewise
have the same effect on the environment. This virtue is gentleness, which can
be seen as the positive derivative of the non-violence (ahimsā) precept in
Buddhism. With respect to this First Precept in Buddhism, all actions which
intentionally harm other sentient beings are considered morally wrong. In the Dhammapada
one is reminded that just as a person recoils at the thought of pain and
treasures his own life, so do other sentient beings. Thus, suffering should not
be inflicted on others (D 129-130). Buddhism not only urges people to be gentle
in their daily dealings with other people and animals, but it also encourages
people to avoid means of livelihood that brings about intentional harm to others.
Thus, making a living by trading weapons, trading human beings, trading flesh,
trading spirits and trading poison ought to be avoided, according to the Buddha
(A 5:177). In addition, earning a living as pig and sheep butchers, hunters,
thieves and murderers resulted in terrible consequences to the individual that
no water ablution can eliminate (Therīgāthā
242-3).
While
the non-violence virtue directly speaks about how one treats fellow human
beings and animals, it would be peculiar if a person acts with great respect
towards all sentient beings, but makes a complete turn-about when it comes to
plants which in Buddhism is considered to be non-sentient or at best, border-line
sentient beings.[4]
One would expect that those who display gentleness towards people and animals
would also extend this demeanor towards plants and even non-living things like
a historic boulder or a cave. When gentleness permeates a person’s veins, it is
displayed in his actions which affect all the things around him. Environmental
well-being then greatly depends on a human community that knows how to refrain
from doing violence to its members and to others. By acting with gentleness
towards others, environmentally negative events such as the extinction of
animal species due to excessive hunting or the loss of plant species due to
destruction of forests can be prevented.
Moderation
A
third virtue in Buddhism that I would like to present here is moderation, which
is the antidote for the greed that is detrimental to one’s quest for
liberation. There is a plethora of texts
in the Buddhist canon that exhorts the individual to exercise self-discipline
and restraint in behavior, resisting temptation and indulgence in the senses. The
Aggañña Suttra of the Dīgha Nikāya (DIII, 80-98) tells a fanciful
tale of the beginning of the world where as (pre)human beings went through
moral degeneration, filling their hearts with greed, hatred, and envy, human
lives became less and less joyful.[5]
In the beginning, the beings were luminous and weightless creatures floating
about space in pure delight. However, as time passed, on earth, there appeared
a sweet and savory substance that piqued the curiosity and interest of the
beings. They not only ate the substance, but due to greed seeping in, they ate
it voraciously which led to its eventual depletion. In the meanwhile, due to endlessly feeding on
the earth substance, the weightless beings eventually would not only become
coarse individuals with a particular shape, but also lose their radiance. The
story then goes on to tell how the natural world and human society continue to
evolve in unwholesome manners as a result of the depraved actions of humanity. This
tale clearly shows that there is a causal connection between human virtuousness
and the state of the natural world. The lack of moderation, thus, can be seen
to be a cause for great detrimental effects not only to the surrounding
environment, but also to the state of one’s own spiritual well-being. While
Buddhism does not advocate abject poverty, the Buddha indeed taught that
dependence on material things was a hindrance towards spiritual progress. Monks
were asked to have as their possessions not more than a robe and a bowl, enough
food for a day, simple lodgings and medicine. On the other hand, such things as
gold and silver, high beds, garlands and other luxury items were to be avoided.
For the Buddha, a life that led to true happiness was not one controlled by
sense desires, but rather by simplicity and having morality as a guide.
One
can immediately see how simple living advocated by Buddhism would have profound
effect on environmental well-being. Maintaining moderation in one’s life
results in less pressure on natural resources, thus positively affect
sustainability. I believe it does not take much to convince us here that the
less we make demands on nature, the more successful we will be in maintaining
sustainability. The late Thai monk Buddhadasa would remark that climate change
and other imbalances in nature being experienced at this time is a result of an
internal human moral degeneration that affects the external dimension of the
world.[6]
Thus, by setting limits on our lifestyle, focusing on what we truly need rather
than what we like or what we want, the possibility for spiritual progress
becomes more real, and the natural world also benefits from our exercise of
restraint.
Gratitude
A final virtue
that I will mention here is that of gratitude. Many scholars in both secular
and religious environmental ethics highlight gratitude towards nature as a key
characteristic that contributes to promoting environmental sustainability and
well-being. Buddhist scholars point to the doctrine of kataññukatavedi in which one is conscious of the favor
that one receives and has the mind to reciprocate such favor. With respect to
nature, gratefulness entails being aware of the benefits that one receives from
nature and thus has the intention to reciprocate by protecting nature and its
resources. The Phra Dharmakosajarn points to the Buddha as the embodiment of
gratitude. After the Buddha achieved Enlightenment, he traveled to his homeland
to pay gratitude to his father as well as to the surrounding environment. In
addition, the Buddha was very grateful to the Bodhi tree under which he sat to
meditate seven days before achieving his ultimate goal of Enlightenment (16). Nature
was indeed appreciated by the Buddha who not only gained Enlightenment under a
tree, but also mostly built monasteries in and taught out of forest
settings. The tradition of monks living
in the forest was encouraged by the Buddha and continues until this day. In
Thailand, many forest monasteries were built in the Sukhothai dynasty during
the reign of King Lithai. Forest monasteries continue to hold great importance
in the life of Thai Buddhism today. According to Phra Dharmakosajarn, to follow
the Buddha means to follow in his footsteps by not only carrying out such rules
imposed on monks such as not cutting down trees, not spitting on trees or in
waterways, but also to promote environmental well-being by cultivating forests
and protecting watersheds (18).
Another Thai
monk, Phra Prayudh Payutto also highlights the virtue of gratitude as essential
to promoting environmental well-being. As a starting point for his discussion
on gratitude, Phra Prayudh quotes the passage from the Khuddaka Nikāya
which states, “A person who sits or sleeps in the shade of a tree should not
cut off a tree branch. One who injures such a friend is evil.” He exhorts
people to see nature as something that they are in intimate relationships with
not only by virtue of mutual benefits that each brings to the other, but also
because both are bound together in the natural process of birth, old age,
suffering, and death. Recognition of mutual friendship is an internal
disposition that subsequently is demonstrated in concrete actions of
cooperation and solidarity rather than destructive ones. He writes, “Since we
must be bound to the same natural law we are friends who share in suffering and
joy of one another. Since we are friends who share in both suffering and joy of
one another we should help and support one another rather than persecute one
another” (Thai 21).[7]
Conclusion
From this cursory
and unsystematic list of Buddhist virtues that have important ramifications for
environmental sustainability and well-being, we see that while early Buddhism
may not have directly addressed the issue of the environment, this does not
mean that Buddhism does not have the resources for us to draw upon in order to
promote environmental well-being. In this paper, I have tried to argue that it
is not possible to apply certain concepts from Western philosophy and secular
environmental ethic to Buddhism. In particular, the notion of intrinsic value
in nature, which is a fundamental issue in secular environmental ethic, cannot
find support in Buddhism because of the Buddhist denial of an intrinsic self
with its Three Marks of Existence. Buddhism does not make any conclusions about
the value of natural entities but sets its sight on the ultimate value—the
cessation of suffering and liberation. Thus, the Buddhist contribution to
promoting environmental well-being rests not in how it perceives nature but in
how it encourages its adherents to conduct their lives so as to achieve
spiritual progress. To this end, I have tried to show that acting on behalf of
oneself cannot be separated from acting on behalf of others. Therefore, actions that promote the
well-being of the environment are intimately connected to actions aimed at
achieving one’s own spiritual progress. When a person is able to display loving
kindness and compassion towards others, exercise gentleness towards sentient
and non-sentient beings, exercise self-control over his desires for material
possessions and a lifestyle that brings about depletion of natural resources, and
demonstrate gratitude towards others for favors received, he achieves a higher
spiritual state in his own life, accumulates greater merit, and has a better
chance for a rebirth in a happier realm than the present one. By reforming
one’s internal disposition, the results will be displayed in outward actions
that opt for the well-being of nature, such as choosing to use energy produced
by alternative and sustainable technologies rather than the traditional methods
that are detrimental to the environment.
It must be stated that the Buddhist virtues that have implications for
environmental well-being are not limited to those mentioned above. One may list
many other ones that are relevant to Buddhist spirituality and are correlated
to the concern of the environment. However, the greatest concern for our present
time is not whether Buddhism has the resources that help with the ecology, but
how these resources are made use of and applied in the life of the Buddhist
adherents and those who are interested in Buddhist spirituality so that through
their religious convictions, they become contributors in the effort to promote
environmental well-being and sustainability.
ABBREVIATION
A
Aṅguttara Nikāya
D Digha Nikaya
Dp
Dhammapada
S Saṃyutta Nikāya
Vis.M. Visuddhimaga
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[1]
This article is an expanded version of the paper delivered at the conference on
18 September 2014 in Bangkok, Thailand.
[2]
A discussion on intrinsic value in nature from a Christian perspective can be
seen in the work of Jame Schaeffer (2009). Theological Foundations for
Environmental Ethics: Reconstructing Patristic and Medieval Concepts.
Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press.
[3]
Author’s own emphasis.
[4]
See discussions on the sentience of plants in Schmithausen, Lambert. Plants
in Early Buddhism and the Far Eastern Idea of the Buddha-Nature of Grasses and
Trees. Lumbini International Research Institute, 2009. Also Findly, E. B.. “Borderline
Beings: Plant Possibilities in Early Buddhism.” Journal of the American
Oriental Society, 122.2 (2002): 252–263.
[5] Although the
original intention of the Buddha in telling this story to the Brahmins is to
critique the caste system as falsely deemed to be divinely ordained, the story
obviously has valuable implications for human-nature relationship as well.
[6]
http://www.thaibuddhism.net/Bud_Ecology.htm
[7]
My own translation of the original Thai text.
